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<a>I. INTRODUCTION 
 
18.01 This chapter is slightly peculiar in nature in the sense that it does not offer a 
commentary of a single instrument. There is after all, as yet, no single instrument that 
deals with the private international law aspects of intellectual property (IP) rights at 
(8OHYHO:KDWLVWRIROORZLVWKHUHIRUHDµWRXUG¶KRUL]RQ¶ of the topic and an answer 
to the question how the existing private international law instruments apply to IP. 
Rather than to repeat the exhaustive analysis that has been offered on other 
occasions,1 we will focus on provisions and points that create difficulties and we will 
offer suggestions for a way forward.2 In Section II we will look at issues of 
jurisdiction and in Section III we will turn to issues of choice of law. 
 
<a>II. JURISDICTION 
 
                                                 
1
 See J.J. Fawcett and P.L.C. Torremans, Intellectual Property and Private International Law, 2nd ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2011.  
2
 See European Max Planck Group on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, Conflict of Laws in 
Intellectual Property: The CLIP Principles and Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
<b>1. The Starting Point  
 
18.02 Jurisdiction is in this area governed by the Brussels I Regulation.3 The rules of 
that Regulation apply to intellectual property and that results e.g. in a standard rule 
that the defendant can always be sued in the courts of the country where he or she is 
domiciled.4 That rule does not create particular difficulties for IP cases and neither 
does the alternative rule for contractual issues which is found in Article 7(1).5 When it 
comes to infringement of IP rights the tort rule in Article 7(2)6 gives the claimant 
another alternative. The concept of the place where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur does cause some problems of interpretation though in an intellectual property 
context. Parallel territorial IP rights may result in damage occurring in several 
jurisdictions. The court in each of these jurisdictions will only have jurisdiction to 
KHDU WKH FDVH LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKH ORFDO GDPDJH WKH FRXUWRI WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VGRPLFLOH
under Art. 4 is still available to hear the whole case) as a result of the Shevill case.7 
That later case also refers to the act leading to the damage and gives jurisdiction to the 
courts of the place where the defendant has its establishment. It may be better in an IP 
context to replace that by the place where the infringement takes place. But with these 
little issue sorted, Article 7.2 causes in effect few problems in an IP context. More 
issues arise when there are multiple defendants who the claimant wishes to sue in one 
court (Art. 8.1) and the issue of exclusive jurisdiction risks to distort the whole 
picture. We will now in turn look at these two more problematical issues. 
 
<b>2. Article 8.1 Brussels I (recast) 
 
18.03 Multiple defendants can be sued in a single court, or as Article 8.1 puts it: 
<quotation>A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 
(1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place 
where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely 
connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the 
                                                 
3
 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
[2012] OJ L351/1. 
4
 Article 4.1 of the recast (old Art. 2). 
5
 Of the recast, old Art. 5.1. 
6
 Of the recast, old Art. 5.3. 
7
 Case C-68/93 Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-415. 
risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings.</quotation> 
 
18.04 The nature of the close connection required (for the use of Art. 8(1)) where 
there has been an infringement of a European patent was settled by the decision of the 
Court of Justice (CJEU) in Roche Nederland BV v Primus.8 But despite the fact that 
the Court keeps referring to that judgment, we will see later that some flexibility 
seems to have been created since. The plaintiffs in Roche, who were US proprietors of 
a European patent granted for ten States (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, the UK, Switzerland, Sweden, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg) brought 
an action in the Netherlands for infringement against Roche Nederland BV, a 
company established in the Netherlands, and eight other companies in the Roche 
Group (established in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, the UK, Switzerland,9 
Sweden, and the US10). The alleged infringement consisted in placing medical 
equipment on the market in countries where the defendants were established. Each of 
the eight defendants was alleged to have infringed the patent in one or more States. 
The eight defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the Dutch courts.11 The Hoge 
Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) in essence referred two questions to the 
CJEU 7KH ILUVW TXHVWLRQ ZDV HVVHQWLDOO\ µZKHWKHU $UWLFOH  RI WKH %UXVVHOV
Convention must be interpreted as meaning that it is to apply to European patent 
infringement proceedings involving a number of companies established in various 
Contracting States in respect of acts committed in one or more of those States [. . .]¶12 
 
18.05 The C JEU, when determining whether there was a risk of irreconcilable 
judgments, introduced and applied the twin requirements that possible divergences 
between the decisions of the courts in the States where the defendant was established 
must arise in the context of the same situation of law and fact. As regards the same 
                                                 
8
 Case C-539/03 [2006] ECR I-6535. 
9
 The Lugano Convention would apply to this action and the CJEU was not directly concerned with this 
action. However, the decision of the Court on Art. 6(1) of the Brussels Convention has an indirect 
effect on the interpretation of Art 6(1) of the Lugano Convention, see AG Léger in Roche, above, at 
[44] of his opinion. Rulings on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention are an aid to interpretation 
of the Lugano Convention. 
10
 The action against the USA defendant was a matter for Dutch traditional rules of jurisdiction and the 
CJEU did not concern itself with this. 
11
 The defendants also denied any infringement and questioned the validity of the European patent. 
12
 Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland BV v Primus (Roche), [18]. 
situation of law, the Court, after referring13 to various provisions in the European 
Patent Convention,14 adopted the traditional view that a European patent once granted 
becomes a bundle of national patents.15 The Court concluded that any divergences 
between the decisions given by the courts concerned would not arise in the context of 
the same legal situation.16 As regards the requirement of the same factual situation, 
WKLVWRRZDVQRWPHWµVLQFHWKHGHIHQGDQWVDUHGLIIHUHQWDQGWKHLQIULQJHPHQWVWKH\DUH
DFFXVHGRIFRPPLWWHGLQGLIIHUHQW&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWHVDUHQRWWKHVDPH¶17 The upshot 
was that any diverging decisions could not be treated as contradictory.18 The 
significance of the defendants being different was explained by Advocate General 
LéJHU ZKR VDLG WKDW µDV WKH GHIHQGDQWV FRQFHUQHG E\ HDFK RI WKHVH GHFLVLRQV DUH
different, the decisions may be enforced separately and simultaneously for each of 
WKHP¶19 
 
18.06 In reaching its decision the Court rejected the spider in the web doctrine. The 
Court was asked in a second question essentially whether the answer to the first 
TXHVWLRQZRXOGEHDQ\GLIIHUHQWµZKHUHWKRVe [defendant] companies, which belong to 
the same group, have acted in an identical or similar manner in accordance with a 
FRPPRQSROLF\HODERUDWHGE\RQHRIWKHP¶20 Reference to the defendants acting in an 
identical or similar manner brings out the point that the Court was concerned with the 
situation where the alleged infringing acts of the various defendants were the same or 
virtually the same.21 The Court held that, even in this situation, Article 8(1) would not 
apply.22 It accepted that the factual situation would be the same.23 But the legal 
                                                 
13
 Ibid, [29]±[30]. 
14
 Referring to Art. µWKH(XURSHDQSDWHQWVKDOO LQHDFKRIWKH&RQWUDFWLQJ6WDWHVIRUZKLFKLW LV
granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that 
VWDWHXQOHVVRWKHUZLVHSURYLGHG LQ WKLV&RQYHQWLRQ¶ Art. µD(XURSHDQSDWHQWVKDOO >«@confer 
on its proprietor from the date of publication of the mention of its grant, in each Contracting State in 
respect of which it is granted, the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent granted in that 
6WDWH¶DQGArt. µDQ\LQIULQJHPHQWRID(XURSHDQSDWHQWVKDOOEHGHDOWZLWKE\QDWLRQDOODZ¶RI
the Munich Convention. 
15
 See the opinion of AG Léger in Case C-539/03 Roche, [23]. 
16
 Case C-539/03 Roche, [31]. 
17
 Ibid, [27]. 
18
 Ibid, [32]. 
19
 The opinion of AG Léger in Case C-539/03 Roche, [109]. 
20
 The Court of Justice in Case C-539/03 Roche case, [18]. 
21
 This is clear from the terms of the original reference from the Dutch court, see Case C-539/03 Roche, 
[17]. 
22
 Case C-539/03 Roche, [34]. 
situation would remain different because with a European patent each defendant 
would be infringing a different patent.24 
 
18.07 This very strict interpretation almost entirely ruled out the application of Article 
8(1) in a situation where parallel territorial IP rights are involved. There would simply 
never be the same situation of law and therefore one could rule out the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments. But despite the fact that the Court pays lip service to the 
Roche decision, a recent case casts serious doubt on that conclusion and suggests that 
a fair degree of flexibility (and uncertainty) has been introduced. In the Painer case25 
Mrs Painer was allowed to use Article 8(1) to sue both German and Austrian 
newspaper editors in the courts in Vienna who had published a picture in which she 
had copyright. The Court of Justice accepted that there was a same situation of law as 
a result of an EU Directive harmonising copyright in photographs. Allowing two 
courts to apply that law could lead to irreconcilable results. But a Directive is still 
implemented in national law and just like in Roche there were in the end territorially 
limited patents there  are here territorially limited copyrights based on German and 
Austrian copyright law (as harmonised by the Directive). Accepting a risk of 
irreconcilable judgments in such a case clearly goes beyond the strict approach in 
Roche. In the presence of strongly harmonised provisions territoriality no longer 
seems to be the hurdle is appeared in Roche. But it is as yet unclear how far the Court 
of Justice is prepared to go on this point.26 
 
<b>3. Article 24(4) 
 
18.08 In private international law terms rules on exclusive jurisdiction have now 
become a rarity. But their impact can be huge, as they overrule any other jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                            
23
 Ibid. See also the opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-462/06 Glaxosmithkline, Laboratoires 
Glaxosmithkline v Jean-Pierre Rouard at [35]±[36], which involved an employee suing joint employers 
in the same group. The organisational or economic links between the two defendants were taken into 
account as evidence of the requisite close connection between the two claims. 
24
 Case 539/03 Roche, [35]. 
25
 Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH et al. [2011] ECDR 6. 
26
 )RUDGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLV VHH7RUUHPDQV µ/DSURSULété intellectuelle met l'article 6 (1) du Règlement 
Bruxelles I à O¶éSUHXYH¶LQMélanges André Lucas (2014). 
rule. It is therefore important to note that Article 24(4) Brussels I Regulation contains 
such an exclusive jurisdiction rule in relation to certain aspects of IP rights: 
 
<quotation>The following courts of a Member State shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction, regardless of the domicile of the parties: 
>«@ 
(4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade 
marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, 
irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defence, 
the courts of the Member State in which the deposit or registration has been 
applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union 
or an international convention deemed to have taken place.</quotation> 
 
If one takes into account that the invalidity point is often raised by the defendant in 
infringement cases the potential impact of this provision immediately becomes clear. 
 
18.09 Exclusive jurisdiction provisions have a long history in private international law 
instruments that cover IP rights.27 The most convincing reason for their existence that 
is still valid is that they touch on proceedings the outcome of which may require an 
intellectual property office to correct its registers. That link with a national procedure, 
where one can see a parallelism with a national court using its own procedural law, 
militates in favour of the case that gives rise to it being handled on an exclusive basis 
by the courts of the country of registration. The decision whether or not to grant and 
register an exclusive right also touches upon the public policy of the country and 
deciding whether or not the right was correctly and justifiably granted then easily 
becomes a matter for the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of the country of 
registration. 
 
                                                 
27
 See e.g. Fawcett and Torremans, 12±19. 
18.10 A first restriction that becomes apparent is due to the vital role played in this 
context by the registration. Without it the issues and arguments mentioned above do 
not arise. This is why the exclusive jurisdiction clause is restricted to registered rights. 
Without registration one cannot argue that the office incorrectly registered the right or 
that the procedure will result in an instruction being given to the office by the court. 
 
18.11 This of course does not mean that validity issues may never arise in relation to 
unregistered rights such as copyright. They do not arise in the same context though. 
An argument that a copyright is not valid is often brought in a certain context where 
the real issue is that the right dos not extend to the activity of the alleged infringer. 
And even if the argument is really that there is not copyright in the work altogether, 
e.g. because of a lack of originality, the outcome will have a mere intra-partes effect 
in most cases. Private litigation between two private parties cannot have more than 
inter-partes effect, unless the legislature has provided for it. A rare example where 
this may arise is in relation to unregistered Community designs. An invalidity action 
is possible here and will have effects that surpass the parties. In those rare cases 
foreign courts can take decisions with erga omnes effect concerning unregistered 
rights. 
 
18.12 A second restriction is found in the link between these scenarios and the alleged 
error of the IP office in the registration process. Traditionally this has resulted in 
wording such as disputes µconcerned with the validity and registration¶ being used. 
First, there are a number of basic elements involved. There may have been a problem 
with the grant of the right itself. The problem may also not be the grant as such, but 
the registration as the technical result that flows from it. And finally the essence may 
be invalidity, i.e. for one reason or another the right was not validly granted and 
registered and should never have existed. The registration can also be abandoned or 
may be revoked, e.g. as a result of being declared invalid. It is worth spelling these 
elements out, as it shows clearly the limited number of scenarios that may give rise to 
exclusive jurisdiction. Exclusive jurisdiction is valuable, but only in these clearly and 
narrowly circumscribed conditions.28 
 
18.13 One cannot escape the GAT v LUK decision in this area, even if it gives rise to a 
lot of unease. Clearly a change from the existing provisions of the Brussels 
Convention 196829 and the Brussels I Regulation30 is intended here, as these 
provisions have given rise to an interpretation by the Court of Justice in GAT v LUK31 
that was eagerly awaited, but that produced undesirable side effects.32 What exactly 
the change is will become clearer if we look at the decision in some more detail. 
 
18.14 The Court of Justice refers back to its earlier decision in Duijnstee v 
Goderbauer.33 That case centred around the issue of the ownership of a patent and 
article 16 of the Convention, as it then was, was raised. The Court reiterates its 
starting position in Duijnstee WKDW WKH QRWLRQ RI SURFHHGLQJV µFRQFHUQHG ZLWK WKH
registration or validiW\RISDWHQWV¶PXVWEHUHJDUGHGDVDQLQGHSHQGHQWFRQFHSW7KDW
independent concept was held in Duijnstee to include proceedings relating to the 
validity, existence or lapse of a patent or an alleged right of priority by reason of an 
earlier deposit. Any other matter falls outside the scope of the independent concept 
and thus of the exclusive jurisdiction that comes with it. In Duijnstee this was the case 
                                                 
28
 See Judgment of 1 October 2010 of the Belgian Supreme Court (Hof van Cassatie-Cour de 
Cassation), X v Universitair Medisch Centrum Utrecht and others, [2011] 1 Tijdschrift@ipr.be 
(www.ipr.be), 73. 
29
 Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters [1972] OJ L/299/32, Art. 16(4). 
30
 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L/12/1, Art. 22(4). 
31
 Case C-4/03 Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co KG (GAT) v Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG (LUK) [2006] ECR I-6509. 
32
 See A. .XU µA Farewell to Crossborder Injunctions? The ECJ Decisions GAT v LuK and Roche 
Nederland v Primus and Goldenberg¶2006) IIC, 37, 844±55; P.L.C. Torremans, µThe widening reach 
of exclusive jurisdiction: Where can you litigate IP rLJKWVDIWHU*$7"¶in A. Nuyts, (ed.), International 
Litigation in Intellectual Property and Information Technology, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan 
den Rijn, 2008, 61±77; P.L.C. Torremans, µOvercoming GAT: The way ahead for cross-border 
LQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\OLWLJDWLRQLQ(XURSH¶Tijdschrift@IPR.be, 7(2), 65±79; P.L.C. Torremans, 
µThe way forward for cross-ERUGHULQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\OLWLJDWLRQ:K\*$7FDQQRWEHWKHDQVZHU¶in 
S. Leibel and A. Ohly (eds.), Intellectual Property and Private International Law, Mohr Siebeck, 
Tübingen, 2009, 191±210; P.L.C. Torremans, µConsolidation of intellectual property litigation in 
(XURSH¶in Essays in honour of M.P. Stathopoulos, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers, Athens, 2010, 2985±
3007. 
33
 Case 288/82 Duijnstee v Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663. 
for the ownership issue, but it would also be the case for an infringement issue as 
such. It is significant that the Court starts its reasoning by approving the Duijnstee 
decision. However, if this is the basis of the matter the Court should also have 
reminded itself that it held in Duijnstee that the then Article 16(4) was an exception 
on the general rules of jurisdiction and that as such it needed to be interpreted 
restrictively. This approach was clearly reflected in the way in which the independent 
concept was defined. Nevertheless, the confirmation of the exclusion of the ownership 
question from the scope of exclusive jurisdiction can only be welcomed and 
approved. 
 
18.15 The Court then moves on to refer to the fact that in practice the issue of validity 
is often raised as a plea in objection in an infringement action. It can also be invoked 
in support of a declaratory action seeking to establish that there has been no 
infringement, as a means to establish that no enforceable right exists upon which the 
defendant can rely. And of course validity can be raised in its own right by means of a 
claim or a counterclaim. The Court comes to the conclusion that the rule of exclusive 
jurisdiction laid down in Article 22(4) of the Regulation concerns all proceedings 
relating to the registration or validity of a patent, irrespective of whether the issue is 
raised by way of an action or a plea in objection. As soon as the validity issue is 
raised, irrespective of the stage at which this takes place, any court other than the 
court of the country of registration will have to declare itself incompetent. This is 
clearly due to the unduly wide interpretation which the use of the wording µconcerned 
with¶ allows. Hence the need to use a more restrictive concept. 
 
18.16 But the decision leaves quite a few questions unanswered. What would happen 
if a mere infringement action is brought in another court, i.e. invalidity has not (yet) 
been raised? The CJEU does not offer guidance, but it is submitted that there is 
nothing in the judgment that would allow that other court to decline jurisdiction. At 
least as long as the validity point is not raised, the court would be obliged under e.g. 
Article 2 or Article 5.3 of the Regulation to take jurisdiction. The opposite point of 
view was taken obiter by Lewison J in the UK Patents Court in Knorr-Bremse 
Systems for Commercial Vehicles Ltd v Haldex Brake Products GmbH.34 In his view 
WKHFRXUWVKRXOGGHFOLQHMXULVGLFWLRQDVVRRQDVLWLVDZDUHWKDWWKHYDOLGLW\SRLQWµLVWR
EHUDLVHG¶6LQFHYDOLGLW\ LVPRVW OLNHO\ WREHUDLVHG LQ LQIULQJHPHQWFDVHVDQGVLQFH
from a UK point of view validity and infringement are intimately related to one 
another such an interpretation would expand the exclusive jurisdiction clause in 
Article 22(4) to virtually all infringement cases. That clearly goes against the whole 
structure and wording of the Regulation and that interpretation is therefore clearly not 
acceptable. Any jurisdiction rule on infringement would almost become superfluous. 
/HZLVRQ -¶V DSSURDFK ZRXOG DOVR OHDG WR DEVXUG DQG XQDFFHSWDEOH FRQVHTXHQFHV LI
thought through to its final conclusion. If we apply it to a breach of contract case 
between a licensor and a licensee where the case is brought in England on the basis of 
an exclusive jurisdiction clause, but where the IP right concerned is foreign, the 
option that the licensee who is allegedly in breach of the contract can (and is likely to) 
raise the validity of the IP right should lead the English judge to decline jurisdiction. 
That could mean that no other court has jurisdiction over the main issue and that there 
is no other forum. Clearly this is not acceptable and cannot be right. 
 
18.17 But what exactly would happen once the validity issue has been raised in a case 
that started life as an infringement case? Is there a way forward de lege lata in such a 
scenario? Clearly the court is unable to reach a conclusion in such a case, but would 
that mean necessarily that the whole case needs to be dismissed? Could one continue 
with the case once the parties have obtained a validity judgment in the courts of the 
country of registration? This is apparently not what the CJEU has in mind if one 
accepts its less than straightforward logic. In this logic the whole case becomes part of 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of the country of registration once the validity 
issue has been raised, irrespective of whether the latter initiative has any value to it or 
any chance of success. It is however interesting to note that the Court does not express 
itself on the matter, despite the fact that its Advocate-General raised the issue. The 
point has therefore not been decided. It is therefore submitted that the court should not 
dismiss the case and decline jurisdiction. That is not what the correct application of 
each element of the Brussels Regulation mandates. Instead the court should stay the 
                                                 
34
 Judgment of 7 February 2008, [2008] EWHC 156 (Pat), [2008] I.L.Pr. 26. 
infringement proceedings and give the party that raises the invalidity a short period of 
time during which that party should institute validity proceedings in the court or 
courts that have exclusive jurisdiction on that point. Once a decision on invalidity has 
been reached in the foreign court the infringement proceedings can be continued. A 
failure to bring validity proceedings should be seen as a recognition of the validity of 
the IP right concerned and the infringement court can then proceed with the case too. 
This was the approach taken by the Handelsgericht in Zurich35 in the aftermath of the 
GAT case and the approach was confirmed by the Swiss Federal Court.36  
 
18.18 This Swiss-Brussels I approach is probably the best way forward de lege lata, 
as explained in GAT. The defendant can no longer wreck the case by raising invalidity 
without pursuing it in the foreign court with exclusive validity jurisdiction. On the 
other hand, right holders are faced with an increased chance that validity proceedings 
will follow and may therefore refrain from bringing infringement proceedings (in one 
court) unless they are convinced that their rights can stand up to scrutiny. But 
defendants will also refrain from raising validity if they have no chance of success. 
The approach has advantages and disadvantages for both parties and a fair balance is 
achieved. It is submitted that it is the only way to achieve such a balance in the 
aftermath of GAT without resorting to law reform. The criticism that the whole 
approach is cumbersome, costly and time consuming is not valid, as the claimant is 
not obliged to bring a single set of proceedings and can use other grounds of 
jurisdiction to sue on a country-by-country basis. On the contrary this approach fits in 
with the overall aim of the Regulation to offer the claimant a number of options from 
which it can pick the most convenient, speedy or economical one.  
 
18.19 This brings us very clearly to the real problem that arises. There are scenarios 
where parties have a very real need to consolidate cases. A typical example is a 
European Patent application that gives rise to 15 parallel patents owned and exploited 
by a single company. If another company infringes the patent(s) in all countries 
through the very same activity, carried out on its own, it seems logical from an 
                                                 
35
 Eurojobs Personaldienstleistungen SA v Eurojob AG, judgment of 23 October 2006. 
36
 Eurojobs Personaldienstleistungen SA v Eurojob AG, judgment of 4 April 2007, I. Zivilabteilung 
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economic perspective to assume that a single dispute arises. Bringing a single case, 
e.g. in the habitual residence/place of business of the defendant, to get a single 
resolution of the dispute between the parties seems logical and desirable. It is not 
DFFHSWDEOHWRSXWWKLVVROXWLRQDWWKHPHUF\RIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VJRRGZLOOQRWWRUDLVHWKH
word validity. Putting in motion an unavoidable system that leads to parallel 
litigation in 15 countries once the word validity is on the table is undesirable. It can 
make the procedure so lengthy and costly that it effectively leads to a denial of justice.  
 
18.20 Let us therefore briefly summarise the implications of the judgment, which 
illustrate that an alternative approach is badly needed. Patent cases provide a good 
example. As a result of the judgment in GAT v LUK, taken in its pure form, it will no 
longer be possible to consolidate patent litigation by bringing a single case against a 
defendant dealing with several, parallel patents, unless there is a rare guarantee that 
validity or registration will not be an issue. These cases will now have to be brought 
on a country (of registration) by country (of registration) basis. This will lead to more 
litigation, higher costs and above all, an increased risk of diverging judgments. That 
in turn is likely to undermine trust in the legal and patent system, as right holders will 
find it hard to understand how parallel rights, based on the same facts, examination 
and legal rules can be dealt with differently in different Member States. Let us now 
turn to infringement cases specifically, as they are most affected. The idea of raising a 
claim for infringement occurring in several countries before the courts in the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VFRXQWU\RIGRPLFLOHZLOODSpear as too risky a strategy. This is mainly the 
case because the judgment in GAT v LUK does not seem to impose any obstacle 
against a defendant raising the invalidity defence at a rather late stage in the 
proceedings, to the likely effect that the court seized with the proceedings declares 
itself incompetent to hear the claim any further, thus rendering futile all efforts 
previously invested in the pursuit of the claim. The defendant does not have to justify 
the delay, nor present an arguable case on validity. Simply formally raising the point 
will be sufficient. But the undesirable consequences go even further, as the fact that 
the right holder will not be in a position to secure a judgment that includes other 
Member States and is enforceable there on the basis of the Regulation, may raise the 
reluctance of alleged infringers to enter into any post-litigation settlement concerning 
damages. The Zurich approach set out above can alleviate some of these problems, 
but it remains a second-best solution to work as best as one can with the constraints of 
the GAT judgment. 
 
18.21 One almost senses a desire in the CJEU¶VUHDVRQLQJWRFORVHRIIDQ\VROXWLRQWR
cross-border litigation in as far as it is based on the Brussels I Regulation. One reason 
for this may have been that the Court felt that the existing system formed an abuse of 
the system set out in the Regulation. Defensive Italian or Belgian torpedoes may have 
been a major part of that perceived problem.37 Cross-border cases and the willingness 
of primarily Dutch and German courts to take them had indeed been giving rise to a 
practice whereby equally broad actions for a declaration of non-infringement were 
brought by the alleged infringers in a jurisdiction where there were significant delays. 
The argument of lis pendens would then be brought to make the court in which the 
infringement action was brought decline jurisdiction. And as the delays, particularly 
in the Italian and Belgian courts, could amount to several years this practice would 
shield the alleged infringer from litigation for a considerable period, and hence the 
well-known terms Italian or Belgian torpedoes. They did indeed have the effect of a 
torpedo on the infringement litigation. If anything though, the Court should only have 
blamed itself, as its judgment in Gasser38 did nothing to stop the practice. Instead it 
effectively encouraged these kinds of practices. There was however no need to use 
Article 22(4) of the Regulation to address these problems. The national courts had 
already dealt with them quite effectively on other jurisdiction grounds39. In cases 
involving multiple defendants the common law instrument of the anti-suit injunction 
had also been used to stop defendants from being sued abroad.40 But the Court had 
plugged that hole itself in its Turner decision in 2004.41 Since the courts that took 
cross-border jurisdiction had themselves adopted a careful approach there was really 
very little left in terms of potential abuses or distortions of the system for the CJEU to 
address in GAT v LUK. 
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 18.22 In a sense the bankruptcy of the GAT approach is spelled out involuntarily by 
Court of Appeal in London in its judgment in Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto 
Corporation.42 The court acknowledges there is nothing it can do against the 
undesirable situation in which opposition proceedings are coupled with revocation 
and negative declaration proceedings in the UK in relation to the UK (European) 
patent and negative declaration proceedings in relation to European patents in other 
countries in another Member State. This is the inevitable result of the push towards 
country-by-country proceedings in the UK courts which the ECJ supported in GAT. 
Multiple proceedings at a high cost that can lead to divergent solutions are exactly 
what business does not need. 
 
18.23 The analysis above has shown that it is hard to justify convincingly the decision 
in GAT v LUK.43 In addition, the problems, which were tentatively addressed by the 
practice of cross-border litigation, have not gone away. These still need to be 
addressed. In the light of the fact that the CJEU clearly feels that they cannot be 
addressed in the current legal framework, suggestions for change are warranted. It is 
submitted that the application of jurisdiction rules should be geared towards the 
following objectives: 
<blist> 
- The owners of IP rights existing in different Member States should be given 
access to efficient enforcement, by allowing for consolidation, before one 
competent court, of claims for infringements committed, in all or several of 
the states for which the rights have been granted, 
 
- provided that the competence of the forum can be established under the 
general rules of the Regulation, thereby honouring the basic principles on 
which the Regulation relies, and 
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 - without prejudice to the sovereign rights of other Member States to decide on 
registration and validity of registered intellectual property rights with effect 
against third parties (erga omnes).  
</blist> 
18.24 Let us now turn in a bit more detail to the precise way in which these objectives 
can be achieved and how this has been turned into a detailed proposal in the CLIP 
Principles.44 This remains of course a way forward de lege feranda. 
 
18.25 The way forward is one that reserves the erga omnes decision on validity to the 
court of the country of registration, but that gives other courts, particularly in 
infringement cases, the power to deal with the matter inter-partes, including the point 
of validity if it is raised incidentally. The CJEU rejected this approach in GAT v LUK, 
as in the current version of the Regulation such an inter-partes approach could not be 
guaranteed and depended on national law. These objections will disappear however if 
the inter-partes only effect of such a decision is inscribed in the alternative rule. It is 
therefore submitted that this is the way forward that properly takes into account all the 
relevant interests. 
 
18.26 One should however be aware of the fact that an inter-partes situation can arise 
in peculiar circumstances. The starting point can be an application for a negative 
declaration based on the idea that a certain act does not infringe rights that may exist 
in a vast number of countries. The substantive reason for which the claimant argues 
that there is no infringement could however be that in its view these rights are invalid 
(e.g. for lack of novelty). Jurisdiction can then be based e.g. on the general rule and an 
inter-partes decision remains possible without triggering the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the courts of each of the countries concerned. Whilst this conclusion may seem at first 
slightly unfair, the interest in allowing for consolidation and the tempering effect of 
the interpartes only nature of the decision make this outcome acceptable. Even in 
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those exceptional circumstances the application of the inter-partes rule can be 
supported. 
 
18.27 One could also argue that this approach follows a broader recent trend that can 
also be seen in Article 10 of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.45 
Despite the fact that the issue of validity of an IP right other than copyright or a 
related right is excluded from the scope of the convention the convention recognises 
that the issue may arise as a preliminary matter. And leaving all grand ideas and 
dogmas of substantive patent law in some countries aside validity does essentially 
arise as a preliminary matter in patent infringement cases. The validity of the right 
needs to be dealt with before a decision on infringement can be reached. The Hague 
convention then stipulates  
 
<quotation>However, in the case of a ruling on the validity of an 
intellectual property right other than copyright or a related right, 
recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused or postponed 
under the preceding paragraph only where² 
(a) that ruling is inconsistent with a judgment or a decision of a competent 
authority on that matter given in the State under the law of which the 
intellectual property right arose; or 
(b) proceedings concerning the validity of the intellectual property right are 
pending in that State.</quotation> 
  
18.28 The clear implication of this approach is that only a decision in the country of 
registration will have effect erga omnes and that courts in other countries are not 
deprived of all forms of jurisdiction in this area. Inter-partes decisions clearly are 
acceptable from that point of view. 
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 18.29 In conclusion, there is still scope for exclusive jurisdiction, but it is only 
justified where grant, registration or validity are the essence of the claim and form 
the object of the dispute.46 Outside that limited area exclusive jurisdiction cannot be 
justified as it has been shown to carry with it some highly undesirable consequences. 
Infringement cases in which validity is raised, to take the standard example, will 
therefore not be caught by the exclusive jurisdiction rule. Raising validity in objection 
or as a defence will not give rise to the unavoidable operation of the exclusive 
jurisdiction rule. The impact of the fact that a foreign court will then rule on validity 
is dealt with by taking away the ergo omnes effect of the ruling. The IP office will not 
have to amend its registers and the effect of the ruling remains an inter-partes one. 
That is not a negative point though as the parties to the litigation will see all issues 
between themselves resolved and that was the very aim of the proceedings. 
 
 
<a>III. CHOICE OF LAW 
 
18.30 Two European instruments deal with choice of law and may be relevant in 
relation to copyright. The Rome I Regulation deals with contract choice of law and 
may be relevant for copyright contracts and The Rome II Regulation deals with tort 
choice of law and may therefore be relevant in a copyright infringement context. We 
will deal with them in turn. 
 
<b>1. The Rome I Regulation 
 
<c>A. The Law Chosen by the Parties 
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18.31 The Rome I Regulation47 contains in Article 3 the same starting point as its 
predecessor the Rome Convention 1980,48 i.e. the freedom of the parties to choose the 
law applicable to the contract, a principle that is recognised internationally. This rule 
applies equally to licences and assignments of IP rights and to all other contracts in 
relation to IP and copyright.49 So, in the situation where the parties make an express 
or implied choice of law this choice prevails and no other choice of law problem 
remains unsolved.50 The parties are free to choose any law. The applicable law does 
not need to have a particular connection with the contract. The parties are also free to 
make alternative choices of law.  
 
18.32 According to Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, the parties can, first of all, 
choose the applicable law by making an express choice of law. Such an express 
FKRLFHRIODZLVFOHDUO\SUHVHQWLIWKHFRQWUDFWVWLSXODWHVIRUH[DPSOHWKDWLWLVµVXEMHFW
WR¶RUµJRYHUQHGE\¶DSDUWLFXODUODZRUWKDWLWLVµWREHFRQVWUXHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK¶
a particular law. Whether a specific clause amounts to an express choice of law is a 
matter of interpretation.51 
 
18.33 In the absence of an express choice, Article 3 allows the choice of the parties to 
be demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. Such a 
choice has to be demonstrated clearly. The intention of the parties is a vital element in 
this respect. The court will, in the light of all the facts, have to decide whether the 
parties have made a real choice of law without expressly stating so in the contract. 
However, the court cannot infer a choice, if the parties had no clear intention of 
making a choice.  
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18.34 In most cases, the choice of law of the parties will cover the whole contract. 
However, Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation retains the principle of the Rome 
Convention 1980 that also allows the parties to select the applicable law for a part of 
the contract. This may lead to two situations. The parties may have chosen another 
law that will govern the remainder of the contract, or they may have made no choice 
of law at all for the remainder of the contract.52 The rules to determine the applicable 
law in the absence of a choice by the parties will apply to the remainder of the 
contract in the latter situation. And finally, the parties are also free to agree at any 
time to change the law applicable to the contract, as long as the formal validity of the 
contract and the rights of third parties are not adversely affected by such a change. 53  
 
18.35 Article 3 does not raise any particular problems for contracts in relation to 
intellectual property rights. Accordingly, our analysis will focus on licence contracts 
which do not contain a choice of law.  
 
<c>B. The Applicable Law in the Absence of Choice 
 
 
<d> i. The starting point 
 
18.36 An attempt to address at least some of these issues that arose in relation to 
Article 4 Rome Convention 1980 has been made in Article 4 of the Rome I 
Regulation and this system will apply to contracts concluded as of 17 December 2009. 
The presumption-based approach has been replaced by a list of rules that determines 
the applicable law for certain types of contract. Article 4(1) refers to the law of the 
habitual residence of the seller for sale of goods contracts, to the law of the habitual 
residence of the franchisee for franchise contracts, to the law of the habitual residence 
of the distributor for distribution contracts, etc. Article 4(2) then deals with all types 
of contract that are not found in the list and the characteristic performance rule that 
was established in the Convention is retained for these (without the presumption 
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aspect though).54 The characteristic performance rule is also applied to those cases 
where elements of the contract are covered by more than one of the rules of Article 
4(1). Article 4(3) and 4(4) then refer to what was Article 4(5) in the Convention. 
There may first be an apparent closer connection with another country. The law of 
that other country will apply if this manifestly closer connection is clear from all the 
circumstances of the case. And if Article 4(1) and 4(2) do not allow the identification 
of the applicable law the law of the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected offer the ultimate fall-back position. The Regulation therefore works with 
fixed rules and the characteristic performance for all other contracts, with the closest 
connection as an escape route. In the absence of formal presumptions the latter should 
be used sparingly, but in practice its criterions are the same as in the Convention 
system. Therefore there may not be an enormous change. The insertion of the word 
µVSDULQJO\¶LQArticle 4(3) is of course an attempt to go in the other direction and to 
use the escape clause sparingly,55 but the complex nature of IP contracts is likely to 
undo any such improvement over the old Article 4(5).56 This is not to say though that 
the old approach of the English courts should be continued. But a reduction in 
comparison with the old Dutch approach which was also later approved by the Court 
of Appeal is unlikely to materialise. 
 
18.37 The latter is no doubt also helped by the fact that IP contracts do not easily fall 
within either Article 4(1) or Article 4(2). The original proposal for a Rome I 
Regulation contained a specific rule for IP contracts in Article 4(1) and this would 
have led to the application of the law of the licensor or assignor. With the colleagues 
from CLIP we argued that this rule was unsound. There was no clear definition of 
what was an IP contract. Plenty of franchise and distribution contracts contain strong 
IP components and there would have been a conflict between the various rules in 
Article 4(1) as a result of the overlap. The rules would then also have clashed, as in an 
IP context the franchisee e.g. would have been the licensee rather than the licensor. 
Under the mechanism in Article 4(2) the rules would then have cancelled each other 
out, but this would have defeated the whole idea of having a special rule for IP 
contracts. It is also by no means clear that the choice for the law of the country of the 
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licensor or assignor could have been justified in all cases in a characteristic 
performance / closest connection context. Intellectual property contracts can after all 
be very different in nature. Or as it was put in the CLIP Comments: 
 
<quotation>The wide variety of contracts relating to intellectual property 
rights also calls for a differentiated solution instead of one strict, clear-cut rule. 
Even though the application of the law of the assignor or transferor of the 
intellectual property right might be appropriate in simple contracts which 
resemble an outright sale ± such as an assignment or license for consideration 
in the form of a lump sum payment ±, this does not hold true as a general rule. 
More complex intellectual property transactions often include an explicit or 
implicit duty of the licensee to exploit the intellectual property right, 
sometimes supplemented by clauses indicating quantities of production or 
modalities of use, while the licensor does not accept any commitment beyond 
the toleration of use of his rights. This casts doubt on the proposition that it is 
the licensor who effects the performance characteristic of the contract (as it is 
the licensee who accepts the commercial risks linked to the exploitation). It 
may also be the case that the intellectual property rights licensed or assigned 
are mainly H[HUFLVHG LQ WKHFRXQWU\RI WKH OLFHQVHH¶VRU WUDQVIHUHH¶VKDELWXDO
residence or principal place of business. Another example of an intellectual 
property contract where the performances of both parties are essential and 
characteristic is a contract to publish and distribute a book.57<quotation>  
 
 
18.38 It is therefore satisfying to see that the specific rule for IP contracts has been 
dropped altogether. One should however add that the fact that IP contracts do not 
form a homogeneous group such as e.g. sale of goods contracts and are instead very 
diverse in nature does also mean that the determination of the characteristic 
performance will not be a straightforward affair either. The exercise will have to be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis and it is to be expected that for highly complex IP 
contracts recourse will frequently be had to the closest connection escape route. This 
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is in essence due to the complex nature of many IP contracts, rather than to any 
deficiency in Article 4. 
 
 
<d> ii. Article 4(5) Rome Convention 1980 and Article 4(4) Rome I Regulation 
 
18.39 The impossibility of identifying a single characteristic performance in each 
contract brings us within the scope of Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention 1980 and 
Article 4(4) Rome I Regulation respectively. It is submitted that, for example, cases 
such as the one where there are contributions by many authors, should be approached 
as falling under Article 4(5) Rome Convention 1980 or Article 4(4) Rome I 
Regulation respectively. The characteristic performance rule needs to lead to the 
application of a single law, but in this example it would lead to as many laws as there 
are authors. What remains is that the contract is closely connected with the law of the 
country in which the publisher is established. One either accepts that the contract is 
PRUHFORVHO\FRQQHFWHGZLWKWKDWODZWKDQZLWKHDFKRIWKHDXWKRUV¶ODZVVHSDUDWHO\
in which case Article 4(5) Rome Convention 1980 or Article 4(3) Rome I Regulation 
applies, or one accepts that the closest connection is the one with the country which 
was covered by the publication contract. It is submitted that the latter view is 
preferable, because the fact that there is more than one author does, as such, not 
change the importance of the publisher. Obviously, this solution can only be applied if 
there exists a single country in respect of which publication rights have been granted. 
 
18.40 In more general terms, the strong link with another country which Article 4(5) 
of the Convention or Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation requires is often present. 
That link exists with the protecting country whose law provides for the essential 
copyright protection. This leads to the applicability of the law of the protecting 
country. This approach has as its main advantage the fact that the whole contract, 
including the transfer of proprietary rights, is governed by the same law. It makes 
sense to submit, for example, both the contractual obligation to assign the publication 
rights in a book and the actual assignment to the same law. 
 
18.41 Our approach, as outlined above, applies only to those contracts in which rights 
are granted for a single country; it would be impossible to apply at the same time the 
different laws of all the protecting countries in those situations in which rights are 
granted in relation to more than one country. When worldwide rights and rights in 
relation to many countries are granted, Article 4(5) Rome Convention and Articles 
4(3) and 4(4) Rome I Regulation respectively still refer back to the country with 
which the contract has its closest connection. That country cannot be determined 
easily. The essential element, in most cases that involve complex copyright contracts, 
seems to be the exploitation of the copyright work. It is, therefore, submitted that in 
these cases the closest connection exists between the contract and the country in 
which the exploiter, i.e. the publisher, broadcaster, etc, of the work is established.58  
 
<d>iii. Limitations on the applicable law 
 
<e>(a) Mandatory rules 
 
18.42 It should also be mentioned that the applicability of the law of the contract is 
restricted by mandatory provisions of substantive law that cannot be escaped  or 
derogated from. Most of these mandatory provisions are found in tax and currency 
exchange laws and especially in competition law, in cases where industrial property 
licences are concerned. More generally, they also include all public order provisions. 
The concept of public order provisions remains hard to define in an abstract way, but 
the Court of Justice has provided guidance when it ruled that the term public-order 
legislation  
 
<quotation>must be understood as applying to national provisions compliance 
with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, 
social or economic order in the Member State concerned as to require 
compliance therewith by all persons present on the national territory of that 
Member State and all legal relationships within that State.59</quotation>  
 
18.43 Mandatory rules are therefore rules that require compliance with their terms and 
that impose themselves in all relevant circumstances. We will now look at the relevant 
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provisions of the Rome Convention 1980 and of the Rome I Regulation that bring 
these mandatory rules into the equation in more detail. 
 
<e>(b) The relevant provisions of the Rome Convention 1980 and of the Rome I 
Regulation 
 
18.44 The starting point of the Convention and the Regulation is the principle of 
contractual freedom. The parties are free to choose the applicable law or in the 
absence of such a choice by the parties the applicable law is determined in an 
objective way.  
 
18.45 There are certain limitations on these principles, though. In certain cases, 
overriding or mandatory rules replace, or complement, the applicable law. English 
law was not familiar with the concept of mandatory rules, as such, before they were 
introduced by the Convention, although similar results were reached in a number of 
cases.60 Moreover, English law was familiar with the concept of an overriding English 
statute, which is effectively the same thing as an (overriding) mandatory rule of the 
forum. Given that we are concerned here with European law our analysis will be 
comparative in nature, rather than focusing exclusively on English private 
international law. 
 
18.46 Suffice it to clarify that the Convention uses the term mandatory rules for two 
different concepts. There are in Article 3(3) first of all those substantive law rules the 
parties cannot contract out of, and then in Article 7 there are those rules that impose 
their application in a private international law context even where the applicable law 
is a foreign law. This confusing error in the use of terminology was particular to the 
English language version and did not reflect the idea that two different concepts are at 
play. The Regulation overcomes this terminological error and Article 3 now simply 
refers to provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, which was the 
intention all  along. Article 9 then refers to overriding mandatory rules, which 
emphasises their overriding nature in a choice of law context and the fact that they 
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reflect aspects of what the Court of Justice referred to as public order legislation. As 
will be seen later, in the process other smaller refinements have also been made. 
 
<e>(c) Article 3(3) Convention and 3(3) and (4) Regulation 
 
18.47 Article 3(3) Rome Convention 1980 deals with the narrow case in which all 
relevant factors point to one country, but in which a foreign law (or forum) has been 
chosen. In this case, the mandatory rules of that one country will apply and these are 
defined as the rules one cannot contract out of in a 100 per cent domestic situation, or 
LQRWKHUZRUGVµUXOHVZKLFKFDQQRWEHGHURJDWHGIURPE\FRQWUDFW¶7KLV is a reference 
to the ius cogens µLPSHUDWLYHODZ¶DQGDSXUHO\VXEVWDQWLYHLVVXHLV LQYROYHG7KLV
issue is being dealt with under the criteria of the substantive law, not those of private 
international law.61 
 
18.48 The Convention also used the word mandatory at a later stage for a somewhat 
different concept, which can cause confusion. While retaking the same idea Article 
3(3) Rome I Regulation therefore avoids the term and speaks simply of provisions 
which cannot be derogated from by contract.  
 
18.49 The choice of the parties for a foreign law will be respected but these rules will 
be added to the applicable law, or to put it in the words of the Regulation: 
 
<quotation>Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of 
the choice are located in a country other than the country whose law has been 
chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of 
provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by 
agreement.</quotation> 
 
In other words, the WHUP µPDQGDWRU\¶ LV QR ORQJHU XVHG IRr the purposes of Article 
3(3). 
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 de Boer, 54 (1990) RabelsZ 24,  56. 
18.50 The innovative bit of the new Article 3 is found in paragraph 4 which puts in 
place a mirror provision for those provisions of Community law that cannot be 
derogated from by contract. This is especially relevant as apart from the Treaty 
provisions themselves the area of IP has seen the introduction of a vast number of 
Directive and Regulation based provisions of Community law in recent years, even if 
not all of them have that µPDQGDWRU\¶FKDUDFWHU 
 
<e>(d) Article 5 Rome Convention and Article 6 Rome I Regulation 
 
18.51 These provisions deal with consumer contracts. In relation to these consumer 
FRQWUDFWVWKHW\SHRIµPDQGDWRU\¶UXOHVDUHWKHUXOHVWKDWFDQQRWEHGHURJDWHGIURP by 
agreement. This is what these provisions have in mind. Article 5 Rome Convention 
deals with consumer contracts that arise in three well-defined sets of circumstances. 
In these cases, the mandatory rules of the country of habitual residence of the 
consumer cannot be contracted out of, and the law of the country of the habitual 
residence of the consumer shall apply in the absence of a choice of law by the parties. 
Article 6 Rome I Regulation specifies that the consumer is a natural person who 
concludes a contract for a purpose outside his trade or profession with a person acting 
in the exercise of his trade or profession and that it will only apply if the professional: 
 
<quotation> 
<nlist>(a) pursues his commercial or professional activities in the country 
where the consumer has his habitual residence, or  
(b) by any means, directs such activities to that country or to several countries 
including that country, 
and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.62 </quotation 
</nlist>  
 
,Q WKRVH OLPLWHGFLUFXPVWDQFHV WKHSURYLVLRQVRI WKH ODZRI WKH FRQVXPHU¶VKDELWXDO
residence that cannot be derogated from by contract will be added to the law chosen 
E\WKHSDUWLHVDQGLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDFKRLFHE\WKHSDUWLHVWKHODZRIWKHFRQVXPHU¶V
habitual residence will apply. Apart from contracts for the supply of services that are 
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 Art. 6(1). 
supplied in a country other than the one in which the consumer has his habitual 
residence63 contracts with an IP element to them will not escape the application of 
Article 6 if they meet the requirements set out in the article. 
 
18.52 These Articles may be relevant to certain IP contracts, for example in the case 
of a software licence if the licensee plans to use the software for private purposes 
which fall outside his business. Consumers increasingly download software for 
private use from websites. These transactions too may be covered if the website 
solicits the conclusion of distance contracts. Mandatory consumer protection 
provisions such as Article 5 Rome Convention and Article 6 Rome I Regulation can 
also indirectly take on significance in relation to industrial property licence contracts. 
%HLHU JLYHV WKH H[DPSOH WKDW µWKH\ FDQ PDNH LW LPSRVVLEOH WR LPSOHPHQW D FRQWUDFW
clause obligating a German licensee or subsidiary of a foreign trade mark owner to 
LQFRUSRUDWH D FKRLFH RI IRUHLJQ ODZ LQ LWV FRQWUDFWV ZLWK FXVWRPHUV¶ HYHQ LI WKH
original licence contract obliged it to do so.64  
 
<e>(e) Article 7 Rome Convention and Article 9 Rome I Regulation  
 
18.53 Up to now, we have been concerned with mandatory rules as rules one cannot 
contract out of in a purely domestic situation and a purely domestic contract. Article 7 
Rome Convention and its counterpart Article 9 Rome I Regulation are radically 
different because they deal with mandatory rules of the forum or of third States which 
are mandatory in an international sense. These rules also want to be applied in an 
international context. We are concerned here with substantive law rules which are 
intended to apply regardless of the law applicable to the contract. In English law these 
are known as overriding statutes. Article 9 Rome I Regulation has now re-baptised 
WKHVH UXOHV µRYHUULGLQJ PDQGDWRU\ SURYLVLRQV¶ 7KLV WHUP VSHOOV RXW PRUH SUHFLVHO\
their character and nature. It is on these rules that our analysis will focus. 
 
<e>(f) Mandatory rules or overriding mandatory provisions of the forum 
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 Art. 6(4)(a) Rome I Regulation. 
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 F.K. Beier, µ&RQIOLFWRIODZSUREOHPVRIWUDGHPDUNOLFHQVHDJUHHPHQWV¶ (1982) IIC 162, 169. 
18.54 The obvious mandatory rules for the Convention and overriding mandatory 
provisions for the Regulation are those of the forum. A court applying a foreign 
applicable law inevitably has to decide how to handle its own overriding mandatory 
rules. The Regulation is on this point a logical development from the Convention 
approach. 
 
18.55 Article 7(2) Rome Convention Article 7(2) VWDWHV WKDW µ1RWKLQJ LQ WKLV
Convention shall restrict the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a 
situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract.¶ These rules to which Article 7 refers have been described as règles 
G¶DSSOLFDWLRQLPPédiate.65 This means that they override the conflicts process. They 
are priority rules in the sense that if a certain situation arises, this leads to the 
application of the mandatory rule before recourse can be had to any normal conflicts 
rule.66  
 
18.56 These rules have also been called lois de police.67 Indeed, in the French version 
of the Convention, this is the term used in the heading to Article 7. This name refers 
to their imperative character. They want to be applied in a certain situation 
irrespective of the conflict of law rules. For example, competition law rules often 
want to be applied when effects of the allegedly anti-competitive conduct are felt 
within the jurisdiction. Competition law rules are, indeed, the traditional example of 
mandatory rules. Often this specific category is described as rules which are close to 
public law, but this description is of little practical use in England as the category of 
public law is not readily known or used in England in the way that it is on the 
Continent. 
 
18.57 It may be added that the mandatory rules in Article 7(2) refer to overriding the 
choice of law. They even seem to override the mandatory rules determined by Articles 
5 and 6. $QRWKHU LPSRUWDQW SRLQW LV WKDW LW KDV WR EH µD VLWXDWLRQ¶ ZKHUH UXOHV DUH
mandatory. Rules are only mandatory in certain situations. 
 
                                                 
65
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 R. Vander Elst, Les lois de police et de sûreté (1956). 
18.58 Article 9(2) Rome I Regulation This article retains exactly the same idea. 
Nothing shall restrict the court of the forum in applying its own overriding mandatory 
provisions. The comments made in respect of Article 7 Rome Convention apply in 
this context too. Article 9(1) adds a definition of an overriding mandatory provision to 
which we shall return shortly. 
 
<e>(g) Mandatory rules or overriding mandatory provisions of third States 
 
18.59 Article 7(1) Rome Convention even gives the court a discretionary power to 
take into account mandatory rules of a foreign country with which the situation has a 
close connection. Some Contracting States used their right to make a reservation 
which means Article 7(1) will not be implemented by these countries and as the UK is 
among these Contracting States we will not discuss Article 7(1) in further detail.  
 
18.60 Article 9(3) Rome I Regulation. The use of a Regulation instead of a 
Convention rules out the idea of allowing Member States to express reservations. All 
of them are therefore obliged to apply Article 9(3) to make it possible for the court to 
apply the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of third countries.68 The main 
difference with Article 7(1) Rome Convention is that the third countries whose 
overriding mandatory provisions may be applied are first limited to those countries 
where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed. 
Second, it only applies the overriding mandatory provisions which render the 
performance of the contract unlawful. This makes the provision more predictable and 
certain and therefore much more acceptable. For IP contracts one thinks e.g. of the 
country for which the licence is granted (the licensor and the licensee perform their 
obligations there). The main difference with the situation in respect of the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the forum is that here the court has a discretion 
whether or not to apply the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country 
of the place of performance of the contract. As was already the case in relation to 
Article 7(1) Rome Convention in exercising that discretion whether or not to apply 
the court shall have regard to the nature and purpose of the overriding mandatory 
provisions and to the consequences of their application or non-application. These 
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 See in general A. Chong, µThe Public Policy And Mandatory Rules Of Third Countries In 
International Contracts¶ (2006) Journal of Private International Law, 2(1) 27±40. 
criterions do not provide absolute certainty and predictability, but they steer the 
necessary discretion as the laws of more than one country may be involved and 
contradictions between the provisions and their impact cannot therefore be ruled out. 
Certain of the provisions may also not address the situation that arises in the case that 
directly. 
 
18.61 Article 9(3) may be relevant in an I context. Various national copyright laws 
have provisions on minimum guaranteed equitable remuneration for authors 
irrespective of the contract. The applicable law and the law of the forum may not 
contains these provisions, but under Article 9(3) these equitable remuneration 
provisions in the laws of a number of countries where the contracts obligations are to 
be performed (e.g. distribution of the movie on DVD) may have to be considered by 
the court in the forum (overriding mandatory or not?/use of the discretion). It is also at 
least arguable that the disrespect for the equitable remuneration provisions would 
make the performance of the contract unlawful. 
 
<e> (h) Public policy/ordre public 
 
18.62 This negative principle is found in Article 16 of the Rome Convention 1980 and 
in Article 21 of the Rome I Regulation respectively and could be described as the 
negative other side of the overriding mandatory provision coin. Its application does 
not change the applicable law or the choice of law rules. It is a general emergency 
clause which allows the forum not to apply in a particular case the applicable law 
because that application would create wholly unacceptable consequences from the 
SRLQWRIYLHZRIWKHIRUXP¶VSULQFLSOHVRISXEOLFSROLF\7KHDSSOLFDEOHODZLWVHOI in 
abstracto (i.e. in an abstract and theoretical sense), is not criticised. While there is no 
rule of the forum here which overrides the applicable law, the effect can be much the 
same. If the court finds the foreign rule unacceptable and turns its application down it 
will fall back on the law of the forum to solve the issue in front of it. The use of the 
WHUP µPDQLIHVWO\ LQFRPSDWLEOH¶ stresses the exceptional nature of the public policy 
device. It should be used sparingly, i.e. only in exceptional and extreme cases. The 
&RQYHQWLRQDQG WKH5HJXODWLRQ¶VDSSURDFKVKRZVVWURQJVLPLODULWLHVZLWK WKHSXEOLF
policy exception that existed under the traditional English rules to deal with 
obnoxious rules of contract of foreign countries. A reference to these rules is found, as 
an obiter, in the Apple case.69  
 
18.63 In IP cases, public policy or ordre public could, for example, be invoked in a 
case where the applicable law would lead to the expropriation of the IP right when a 
licence contract for a trademark is not renewed by the holder of the right upon expiry 
of its term. 
 
 
<b>2. The Rome II Regulation 
 
 
<c>A. Scope 
 
18.64 The Rome II Regulation has a broad scope. It introduces a new set of choice of 
law rules for non-contractual obligations that apply to all cases, irrespective of the 
applicable law. Article 3 makes that clear when it talks about the universal application 
of the Regulation, emphasising that any law specified by the Regulation will be 
applied irrespective of whether it is the law of a Member State or not.  
18.65 More specifically the Rome II Regulation:  
 
<quotation>shall apply, in situations involving a conflict of laws, to 
non-contractual obligations in civil and commercial matters. It shall 
not apply, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters 
or to the liability of the State for acts and omissions in the exercise of 
State authority (acta iure imperii).70</quotation> 
 
18.66 Article 15 then produces a helpful list of the issues covered by the Regulation;71 
<quotation>Scope of the law applicable 
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 See Plender and Wilderspin, 435 et seq. 
The law applicable to non-contractual obligations under this 
Regulation shall govern in particular: 
(a) the basis and extent of liability, including the determination 
of persons who may be held liable for acts performed by them; 
(b) the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of 
liability and any division of liability;  
(c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or 
the remedy claimed; 
(d) within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its 
procedural law, the measures which a court may take to prevent 
or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the provision of 
compensation; 
(e) the question whether a right to claim damages or a remedy 
may be transferred, including by inheritance; 
(f) persons entitled to compensation for damage sustained 
personally; 
(g) liability for the acts of another person; 
(h) the manner in which an obligation may be extinguished and 
rules of prescription and limitation, including rules relating to 
the commencement, interruption and suspension of a period of 
prescription or limitation.</quotation> 
 
18.67 Helpful as this may be, it does not solve the characterisation issue.72 Certain 
obligations may arise out of contract, or in a tort case a contractual defence may be 
raised. This means one has to characterise the issue as one in tort or as one in contract 
and delimit the scope of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations vis-à-vis one another.73 
But also inside the group of obligations that have been characterised as tortuous 
further characterisation issues arise. Chapter II of the Rome II Regulation contains a 
general rule and certain specific rules, but one has to take account of Chapter III that 
separates out issues of unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio or culpa in contrahendo 
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and applies different choice of law rules to these issues. The issues in Chapter III do 
not affect IP directly, so they can remain outside the scope of our analysis, but it is 
clear that characterisation is an important question, if only to separate tortuous and 
contractual obligations from one another.  
 
18.68 So how does one define an obligation as tortuous?74 The process should be 
guided by the subject matter and wording of the Regulation itself. The articles 
referred to above especially give clear indications. Recital 7 of the Regulation suggest 
that some form of consistency with Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation would 
obviously be desirable, even if the Rome II Regulation deals with quasi delict in a 
separate Chapter III. Suffice it to say here that the tortuous category is therefore a 
wide residual category.75 In relation to our specific topic there is no doubt that the 
infringement of an IP right has to be characterised as tortuous for the purposes of the 
Rome II Regulation. The only non-tortuous issue that can arise is a contractual 
defence, i.e. where the defendant argues that the alleged infringing acts are covered by 
a licence agreement between the parties and are therefore authorised acts rather than 
infringing acts. That defence based on a licence would therefore be characterised as 
contractual.  
 
18.69 Once the issue has been characterised as tortuous the provisions of the Rome II 
Regulation apply to it to determine the applicable law and in our IP context Chapter II 
will take centre stage with the general rule in Article 4 and the specific IP rule in 
Article 8.76  
 
18.70 Any court in the Member States that is confronted with a tort choice of law 
issue will have to apply the Regulation. The Danish courts are the only exception, as 
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the Regulation does not apply to Denmark.77 But it can lead to the application of 
Danish law and it can be applied to facts that occur in Denmark if a court in another 
Member State has jurisdiction. The restriction to civil and commercial matters in 
Article 1(1) has no further impact in relation to IP infringement cases, as these arise 
necessarily in civil or commercial circumstances. 
 
<c>B. Article 8(1) 
 
18.71 The Regulation combines a general rule, which is based on the application of 
the law of the country where the damage occurs, with specific rules for a number of 
areas, such as the infringement of IP rights. The general rule has escape clauses for 
when both parties have their habitual residence in the same country, where the law of 
that country will apply, and for when there exists a manifestly closer connection with 
another country, where the law of that closer connection will apply.78 
 
18.72 The specific rule for the infringement of IP in Article 8(1)79 reads as follows: 
µ7KHODZDSSOLFDEOHWRDQRQ-contractual obligation arising from the infringement of 
an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is 
FODLPHG¶80 
<d>(i) The relationship with the general rule 
18.73 A first important aspect that needs to be determined is the relationship between 
$UWLFOHDQG WKHJHQHUDO UXOHFRQWDLQHG LQ$UWLFOH7KHXVHRI WKHZRUGµVKDOO¶ LQ
Article 8 and the absence of a cross-reference to Article 4 make it clear that the 
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specific rule leaves no space for the general rule when it comes to the infringement of 
IP rights. Article 8 will be the rule that deals with these cases and the law of the 
country for which protection is claimed shall be applied with the exclusion of any role 
for Article 4. That means that the law of the country for which protection is sought 
applies, even when both parties have their habitual residence in one country that is not 
the country of the law of the country for which protection is sought. And even in 
those cases where a manifestly closer connection could be established with another 
country the law of the country for which protection is sought will have to be applied.81 
There is no room for the escape clauses provided for in Article 4(2) and 4(3) and 
Article 8 does not offer any escape clauses of its own either. 
 
<d>(ii) µ,QWHOOHFWXDOpURSHUW\ULJKWV¶ 
 
18.74 Next the question arises, what then falls within the scope of Article 8? How 
does one define the concept of IP rights for this purpose? Recital 26 of the Regulation 
provides the starting point and offers the following non-exhaustive definition of the 
concept of IP rights: µ)RU WKH SXUSRVHV RI WKLV 5HJXODWLRQ WKH WHUP µLQWHOOHFWXDO
SURSHUW\ ULJKWV¶ VKRXOG EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV PHDQLQJ IRU LQVWDQFH FRS\ULJKW UHODWHG
rights, the sui generis right for the protection of databases and industrial property 
ULJKWV¶ This is not only an open-ended definition, but also a very broad one. The key 
thing all these IP rights seem to have in common is that they grant an exclusive right. 
$ µULJKW¶ KDV WR EH DZDUGHG DQG WKH QDWXUH RI WKH ULJKW JLYHQ WR WKH ULJKW holder is 
µH[FOXVLYH¶ ,W LV, however, not relevant whether one deals with registered or un-
registered rights. The fact that both copyright and IP rights are mentioned in the list 
makes that clear. Industrial property rights are traditionally taken to include patents, 
trademarks and industrial design.82 Apart from the sui generis right for the protection 
of databases to which Recital 26 refers explicitly one could also add the droit de suite 
RUDUWLVW¶VUHVDOHULJKWRU WKHSODQWEUHHGHUV¶ULJKWDVH[DPSOHVRI IP rights, based on 
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the exclusive right they grant. The exclusive right positively enhances the position of 
the creator or inventor of the intangible property. Geographical indications and 
denominations of origin are in this respect a difficult group. On the one hand there is 
an exclusive right, but on the other hand it is given to a group of right holders and 
anyone who produces locally according to the rules can automatically benefit from 
them. On balance though that element is also present in certain types of trademarks 
and it is submitted that that they are still covered by Article 8.83 
 
18.75 There are on the other hand items which are sometimes mentioned in the 
intellectual property context that may not be covered by Article 8. Unfair competition 
is the easy example, as Article 6 of the Regulation introduces a special rule for these 
matters. From a private international law point of view the English tort of passing-off 
has as its main objective to prevent certain forms of unfair competition whereby in the 
original concept a competitor passes its goods off as those of someone else. Whilst 
this may still be controversial in domestic tort law84, for the purposes of the choice of 
law rule in the Regulation passing off should be considered as a non-contractual 
obligation arising out of an act of unfair competition and Article 6 rather than Article 
8 should be relevant in this context.85 In more general terms it should be noted that 
$UWLFOHUHTXLUHVDQLQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\µULJKW¶7KDWLQLWVHOIH[FOXGHVSDVVLQJ-off, 
as the tort does not award a right, let alone an exclusive right. Instead what is on offer 
is an action and/or a remedy. An action for breach of confidence to protect trade 
secrets and other confidential information is another example of a case where the 
remedy replaces the right. It is submitted that all those cases, i.e. a remedy rather than 
an exclusive right is available, fall outside the scope of Article 8. 
 
<c>(iii) µ,QIULQJHPHQWDQGWKHFRQQHFWLQJIDFWRU 
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18.76 Once the concept of IP has been identified one can look at the infringement and 
the connecting factor for the applicable law. In an instrument such as the Rome II 
Regulation one expects to find the typical candidate for non-contractual obligations 
and tort cases, i.e. the law of the place of the tort (the law of the place of the tort), 
even if it is defined here as the law of the country where the damage arises. Instead 
Article 8 turns to the law of the country for which protection is sought. There were 
national laws in Europe that applied the law of the place of the tort  to IP infringement 
cases. The Dutch Private International Law Act on Torts is a good example.86 Its 
Article 3(1) specifically refers to the law of the place of the tort as the applicable law 
in tort cases and there is no specific rule or reference to IP.87 The Dutch Supreme 
Court did, however, in a copyright case apply the tort choice of law rule88 and the Act 
only confirmed the earlier case law of the Supreme Court.89 Questions have moreover 
been asked about the appropriateness of the law of the place of the tort rule for IP 
cases90 and it has been suggested that the parallelism between infringement and scope 
in IP cases presents a strong argument to apply the law of the country for which 
protection is sought principle to infringement too.91 The law of the place of the tort 
rule was therefore not without its critics. The Austrian private international law seems 
to be even clearer on this point. Article 34(1) of the Austrian Private International 
Law Act 197892 refers clearly to the law of the State where the act of exploitation or 
infringement occurred. The official commentary clearly points to a law of the place of 
the tort approach, but the Austrian Supreme Court,93 as well as various authors94 have 
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effectively turned this into a law of the country for which protection is sought rule.95 
It is also interesting to note that the Austrian Supreme Court explicitly mentioned that 
this approach will result in the distributive application of the law of the country for 
which protection is sought on a country by country basis (its own law as law of the 
country for which protection is sought in each country)96 for each in a case of multi-
state infringement: 
<quotation.According to Article 34(1) of the Austrian PIL, the 
creation, scope and termination of intellectual property rights is 
determined by the law of the State where the act of exploitation or the 
act of infringement occurred. Accordingly, the legislator has chosen 
WKH ODZ RI WKH SURWHFWLQJ 6WDWH DV D FRQQHFWLQJ IDFWRU >«@. The 
protecting State is not the State where the proceedings are pending. If 
the plaintiff claims that the defendant has infringed all or some of the 
rights that the former holds in several States, the alleged infringement 
shall be assessed in each State on the basis of the law of the State 
ZKHUHWKHLQIULQJHPHQWWRRNSODFH>«@97 </quotation> 
This quote neatly summarises the operation of the law of the country for which 
protection is sought rule that was found in a number of national laws.98 A clear 
modern example of such an approach is found in Article 93(1) of the Belgian Code of 
Private International Law ZKLFK VWLSXODWHV WKDW µLQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\ ULJKWV DUH
governed by the law of the State for the territory of which the protection of the 
intellectual prRSHUW\LVVRXJKW¶99 The standard for this rule is found in Article 110(1) 
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of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987100 and has been copied in the Italian 
Private International Law Act 1995101 and the German partial codification of tort and 
property choice of law rules.102 Copyright works such as paintings that remain in a 
first country can therefore be infringed by the publication in a second country of 
photographs taken of them without permission. Protection will be sought in the 
second country under the local copyright act that grants protection, automatically and 
without formalities to works that qualify for protection under the Berne Convention. 
The law of the second country will be applied as the lex loci protectionis or the law of 
the country for which protection is sought. 
18.77 Despite the fact that there is no universal preference for the law of the country 
for which protection is sought, even if the Commission took that position,103 there is a 
clear tendency towards various slightly different law of the country for which 
protection is sought approaches. It was therefore desirable to adopt a uniform 
approach in the Rome II Regulation and to adopt a law of the country for which 
protection is sought approach. The law of the country for which protection is sought is 
easy to ascertain, which is an important advantage, whilst the determination of the 
locus delicti may be more complex and less easy to ascertain as national laws have 
slightly different ideas of what an act of infringement entails in relation to the 
determination of the applicable law.104 And the law of the country for which 
protection is sought also governs validity, which eliminates the need to distinguish 
between infringement and validity issues for choice of law purposes. The law of the 
country for which protection is sought also has the advantage that it also applies to the 
scope of the right, its existence and its duration. That parallelism is even more 
valuable as there is a strong link between the scope of the right and its infringement in 
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substantive IP law.105 Finally, one should not forget either that the law of the country 
for which protection is sought approach results each time in the application of the law 
of the State that created the IP as a tool of its economic policy. Or as Jürgen Basedow 
put it: µ%\ WKHLU QDWXUH LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\ ULJKWV DUH OHJDO DUWLIDFWV FUHDWHG E\ D
given state as monopolies limited in time and designed to determine the competitive 
FRQGLWLRQVLQWKHUHOHYDQWPDUNHWVRIWKDWFRXQWU\¶106  
18.78 The law of the country for which protection is sought approach also guarantees 
harmony and consistency in relation to the economic policy of that country. The 
specific wording adopted by Article 8(1) Rome II Regulation to determine the law of 
the country for which proteFWLRQ LV VRXJKW LV WKH µFRXQWU\ IRU ZKLFK SURWHFWLRQ LV
FODLPHG¶7KHXVHRIµIRUZKLFK¶LQWKLVFRQQHFWLQJIDFWRULVLQGHHGPRUHSUHFLVHWKDQ
WHUPV VXFK DV µZKHUH¶ WKDW FRXOG EH WDNHQ WR UHIHU WR WKH IRUXP107 In practice one 
claims protection under the law of the country for which the availability of protection 
is denied.108 This can obviously be done through infringing acts,109 where the acts 
                                                 
105
 See Pertegas, 238. 
106
 J. BasedRZ µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶ LQ - %DVHGRZ - 'UH[O $ .XU DQG $ 0HW]JHU HGV Intellectual 
Property in the Conflict of Laws, Mohr Siebeck, 2005, 2. 
107
 6HH-%DVHGRZDQG$0HW]JHUµ/DZRIWKHFRXQWU\IRUZKLFKSURWHFWLRQLV sought¶LQA. Trunk, 
R. Knieper and A.G. Svetlanov, (eds.), Festschrift für Mark Moiseevic Boguslavskij, Berliner 
Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004, 153 et seq. 
108
 E.g. Peruvian law applied as law of the country for which protection is sought when infringement 
was alleged in Peru, despite the argument that the alleged infringer had his habitual residence in Spain 
and published the allegedly infringing work there. It was sufficient that the work was made available in 
Peru through mass media, such as the internet, and in doing so the moral rights of integrity and 
paternity of the (real) author had been infringed. Decision of the Peruvian Copyright Commission 
INDECOPI of 3rd November 2009, see 
http://www.indecopi.gob.pe/0/modulos/NOT/NOT_DetallarNoticia.aspx?PFL=0&NOT=124 (last 
visited 16 November 2009). And the German Bundsgerichtshof applied German copyright law as law 
of the country for which protection is sought when lamps that were protected in Germany were offered 
for sale there, despite the fact that they were manufactured in Italy where no protection existed. The act 
of offering them for sale denied the availability of protection in Germany. Wagenfeld-Leuchte decision 
of the Bundesgerichtshof of 15 February 2007 (1 ZR 114/04) [2007] GRUR 871.  
109
 These acts must then be an infringement of the IP right under the law of the country for which 
protection is sought. For a negative example see Court of Appeal Tokyo, decision of 27 January 2000, 
[2001] GRUR Int 83 (annotated by A. Petersen) where the manufacturing in Japan of a product that 
enjoyed patent protection in the US and that was to be offered for sale in the US did not constitute an 
infringement in Japan under the Japanese law of the country for which protection is sought in the 
absence of a Japanese Patent. Similarly the US Supreme Court held that manufacturing and selling a 
product that is patented in the US abroad does not amount to infringement in the US, with an exception 
in the sense that § 271 (f) of the US Patent Act specifically declares the supply from the US to a third 
country of components that are then put together to the patented product an infringing act. See 
Microsoft Corp v AT&T Corp 550 US 437 (2007), [2007] GRUR Int 768. And another US decision 
applies US law on the basis that the indirect transmission of a broadcast passed through the US before 
it was communicated to the public and this amounted to an infringement of US copyright law. See 
National Football League v PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
[2000] GRUR Int 1082. One claims protection under a national law by alleging one has an intellectual 
seem to ignore the existence of IP protection, but also by means of a negative 
declaration, where the (potential) infringer requests the court to rule that the IP 
protection does not extend to its activity.110  
 
18.79 A practical example illustrates what this means. When the author of a book 
argues in the French courts that the publication of a book which he deems to be an 
unauthorised copy of his book and the release of the movie based on the book in 
France, the book and the movie having been created and first published/released in the 
US, infringe his copyright the law of the country for which protection is sought is 
French law. The argument is indeed that the publication and release in France deny 
his rights under French law, irrespective of the place of creation or first publication. 
This does of course not stop the same author from arguing too that the first 
publication/release in the US, rather than the subsequent publication/release in France, 
also constituted an infringement. In the latter case he argues that protection is denied 
in the US, under US copyright law, which will be the law of the country for which 
protection is sought in the later case. This also shows clearly that what is not being 
proposed here is to rely on the originating fact, rather than on the damage. These 
concepts may have a place in a law of the place of the tort approach, but not in a law 
of the country for which protection is sought approach.111 Registered rights such as 
trademarks give rise to exactly the same analysis, but of course they require 
registration and no protection can therefore be sought in a country where the right 
holder did not register the right, here the trademark. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
property right there that is infringed. The court will then apply that national law to determine whether 
or not the right has effectively been infringed. 
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18.80 While this probably only sounds strange in an IP context and is quite normal in 
other areas, it is worth pointing out that the law of the country for which protection is 
sought approach will lead courts to apply foreign IP laws.112 
 
18.81 Up to this stage the emphasis has been on the connecting factor, mainly because 
the concept of infringement seems at first glance rather straightforward. Its exact 
content will be addressed underneath on the basis of the list of issues to which the law 
applicable under Article 8(1) applies, but before we do that the distinction between 
direct liability and contributory liability needs to be made as in that context the 
application of the law of the country for which protection is sought has its own 
significance. Contributory liability, sometimes also called secondary liability in 
substantive IP law, arises when one does not infringe directly, e.g. one does not apply 
the trademark to the goods, but facilitates the direct infringement of someone else by. 
Traditionally there has been a strong link with direct infringement, e.g. one provides 
the machinery to copy the CDs or to apply the trademark to the goods, but in a 
modern environment intermediaries such as internet service providers,113 internet 
auction sites114 or search engines,115 while not directly liable, could maybe be held to 
incur a contributory liability in relation to the direct infringement committed by their 
users. The first form of contributory liability is strongly linked to the concept of 
µIDFLOLWDWLQJ GLUHFW LQIULQJHPHQW¶ EXW WKDW OLQN LV PXFK ZHDNHU IRU WKH VHFRQG RQH
ZKHUHIDFLOLWDWLQJ WXUQVPRUH LQWRµPDNLQJ LW WHFKQLFDOO\SRVVLEOHIRU WKLUGSDUWLHV WR
LQIULQJH¶ 7KH ODWWHU LV PXFK OHVV GLUHFWO\ UHODWHG WR WKH GLUHFW LQIULQJHPHQW RI WKLUG
parties. For choice of law purposes the first form of contributory liability could be 
said to be linked so strongly to direct infringement that it is expeditious to apply the 
same choice of law rule, i.e. the law of the country for which protection is sought, 
whilst the latter is more closely linked to general tort matter and the tort choice of law 
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rule could be applied.116 This approach could also be said to map a distinction in 
substantive law. The US Supreme Court has accepted that contributory liability rules 
cannot only be found in IP statutes, but also in general tort principles,117 while in 
Europe the Advocate General accepted the application of general liability rules even 
though the trade mark rules did not include a direct liability rule.118 The Rome II 
Regulation does not, however, follow this dual track approach. Article 8(1) instead 
covers all forms of non-contractual obligations that arise from the infringement of an 
IP right. This must include all forms of contributory liability, as that liability is 
necessarily a non-contractual obligation and as it only arises if there is a (direct) 
infringement of an IP right.  
 
18.82 The law of the country for which protection is sought will therefore apply to all 
forms of contributory liability, be it the traditional form where someone supplies the 
physical means to copy the work or the more distant form where an internet service 
provider is sued for the activities of its subscribers. On the positive side this approach 
continues the parallelism between infringement in all its forms and the right as such, 
which includes things like scope and extent that are closely linked with contributory 
liability. On the negative side it will result in the distributive application of the law of 
the country for which protection is sought on a country-by-country basis also in those 
cases that are only loosely related to direct infringement. The latter cases, such as 
where Google sells trademarks as ad-words to competitors or where eBay auctions 
allegedly illegal goods offered for sale by a trader on the platform, tend to be linked to 
the internet, which means that potentially a very large number of laws will apply. We 
will come back later to these issues of multi-state or ubiquitous infringement. Suffice 
it to add here that the way forward may also include a substantive law approach that 
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defines much more precisely when issues of contributory liability will arise.119 That 
brings us to the (other) issues to which the applicable law, i.e. the law of the country 
for which protection is sought, applies in the context of Article 8. 
 
<d>(iv) The issues to which the applicable law applies 
 
18.83 Once the law of the country for which protection is sought has been defined, 
attention turns to the issues to which it will be applied. Article 8(1) gives a first 
LQGLFDWLRQE\UHIHUULQJWRµDQRQ-contractual obligation arising from the infringement 
of an intellectual propHUW\ULJKW¶$UWLFOHWKHQFODULILHVWKHPDWWHUIXUWKHUE\DGGLQJ
that: 
<quotation>The law applicable to non-contractual obligations under 
this Regulation shall govern in particular:  
(a) the basis and extent of liability, including the determination 
of persons who may be held liable for acts performed by them; 
(b) the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of 
liability and any division of liability; 
(c) the existence, the nature and the assessment of damage or 
the remedy claimed; 
(d) within the limits of powers conferred on the court by its 
procedural law, the measures which a court may take to prevent 
or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the provision of 
compensation; 
(e) the question whether a right to claim damages or a remedy 
may be transferred, including by inheritance; 
(f) persons entitled to compensation for damage sustained 
personally; 
(g) liability for the acts of another person;  
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(h) the manner in which an obligation may be extinguished and 
rules of prescription and limitation, including rules relating to 
the commencement, interruption and suspension of a period of 
prescription or limitation.</quotation> 
 
What will amount to an infringement of an IP right, which exemptions and limitations 
are available, who is seen as a (primary or secondary) infringer, when will damage 
exist for which compensation is due and what kind of damage is acceptable, which 
remedies are available and what is their scope, who is entitled to compensation, are all 
issues to be determined by the law of the country for which protection is sought, as is 
the issue of the termination of the non-contractual obligation. It is also worth noting 
WKDWWKHFRQFHSWRIµDQRQ-contractual obligation arising from the infringement of an 
LQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\ULJKW¶LVEURDGHQRXJKWRLQFOXGHVXFKREOLJDWLRQVDULVLQJRXWRI
unjust enrichment, negotiorum gestio and culpa in contrahendo. The general 
reference to any kind of infringement, without distinguishing according to the 
character or the remedial consequences of the infringement, makes this clear and 
Article 13 repeats it explicitly. This includes also any form of restitution for 
wrongdoing and gain based responses to tort.120 Article 8 takes priority over Chapter 
III.  
 
18.84 That brings us to more procedural issues or in the wording of the Regulation 
µwithin the limits of powers conferred on the court by its procedural law, the measures 
which a court may take to prevent or terminate injury or damage or to ensure the 
SURYLVLRQ RI FRPSHQVDWLRQ¶ ,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR GLVWLQJXLVK KHUH EHWZHHQ SXUHO\
procedural issues to which the lex fori applies and infringement issues to which the 
law of the country for which protection is sought applies. Issues relating to 
enforcement are in IP considered as substantive in nature and fall therefore on the 
infringement side. One thinks here of the scope and the remedies. That also includes 
the content and limitations of the ius prohibendi (the right to prohibit) and the 
availability of injunctions and damages to restrain the infringement. It is therefore for 
each of the leges loci protectionis to decide whether damages (monetary 
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compensation) and injunctions are available in a certain case. Procedural issues are 
left to the national law and in practice most countries such as the UK then apply the 
law of the forum. This covers issues such as the rules of evidence, but also, it is 
submitted, in general the procedures that are available to the claimant to request the 
remedies that are available under the law of the country for which protection is 
sought.121 This may especially in the area of interim injunctive relief give rise to a 
certain form of forum shopping, because while it will always be the law of the country 
for which protection is sought that determines whether a certain remedy is available it 
will be up to the lex fori to determine whether shortened or accelerated procedures to 
obtain these remedies will be available and here certain fora may offer more attractive 
outcomes.122 
 
18.85 The reference to infringement does on the other hand also limit the scope of 
Article 8(1) Rome II Regulation.123 Issues such as the validity of IP rights, registration 
issues in relation to registered IP rights, the scope of the IP right, its transferability 
and its duration, as well as issues of (initial) ownership, are not part of the 
infringement of the IP right and fall therefore outside the scope of Article 8(1). Many 
of these issues may play a role in cases that turn upon the infringement of the right, 
the question whether the claimant really owns the right and the exact width of the 
right are striking examples in this respect, but they are not part of the infringement 
issue as such.124 It is equally important to keep in mind that issues that are related to 
the transfer of IP rights and any licensing issues are contractual in nature and that as 
such they also fall outside the scope of the Rome II Regulation. Again though there 
may be a level of interaction. The existence of a (licence) contract may be a defence 
in an infringement action. And the question may arise whether an action for breach of 
a licence contract can also be brought as an infringement action. Different laws may 
apply depending on the outcome of these matters. But in many cases both contractual 
and non-contractual/infringement issues will arise in a single case, leading to the 
application respectively of the lex contractus (the law applicable to the contract) and 
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the law of the country for which protection is sought.125 Penalty clauses in licence 
contracts are an example of a perceived overlap between contract and tort. Such 
clauses look tortuous in nature, but they are contractual. The Rome II rules do not 
apply if the claimant sues to enforce the penalty clause.126 Instead the lex contractus 
(the law applicable to the contract) will apply.127 
 
<c> C. Article 8(3) 
 
18.86 The final paragraph of Article 8 specifies that the freedom to choose the 
applicable law which Article 14 Rome II Regulation offers will not apply to non-
contractual obligations arising from the infringement of IP rights.128 The main reason 
to deny this innovation of the Rome II Regulation in this context is no doubt the link 
with national authorities granting rights, national registers and national economic 
policies. National law has an interest in theIP right and allowing the parties to choose 
another law would harm that interest and could potentially affect the right as such. 
 
 
<c>D. Overriding mandatory provisions and public policy 
 
18.87 The Rome II Regulation also contains standard provisions that allow the 
overriding mandatory provisions129 and the public policy of the forum130 to be 
safeguarded. The law applicable under Article 8 will not be able to restrict the 
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application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum in a 
situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
non-contractual obligation. And the application of the law determined on the basis of 
Article 8 may be refused if that application is manifestly incompatible with the public 
policy of the forum.131  
 
18.88 In terms of examples of overriding mandatory rules of the forum one might 
think of the availability of injunctive relief in intellectual property infringement cases. 
Both the TRIPS Agreement132 and the EU Enforcement Directive133 hint at the fact 
that this is a basic minimum standard and the absence of injunctive relief as a remedy 
in the applicable law might trigger the application of Article 16 Rome II Regulation 
by an English court hearing the case. The English rules on injunctive relief will then 
be applied as the overriding mandatory rules of the forum. One might also consider 
the infringing character of the act to authorise infringement abroad, to be of an 
overriding mandatory nature for English law. If the applicable law does not have a 
provision covering such an act it is likely that the English courts, which created the 
tort of enabling passing-off (enabling something similar to passing-off being 
committed in Ecuador by knowingly selling Scotch whisky in the UK that would be 
used in Ecuador to mix it with cane sugar alcohol and then sell it as Scotch 
whisky)134, is likely to apply English law as overriding mandatory provision and find 
liability for the act of authorisation. After all creating a separate tort at common law 
went further and indicates that the mandatory nature of provisions to sanction such 
behaviour. 
 
<c> E. Multi-state and ubiquitous infringement 
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18.89 While Article 8 positively excludes the freedom of the parties to choose the 
applicable law, the same provision remains silent on multi-state and ubiquitous 
infringement cases. These cases are, however, not rare and they do create specific 
problems. Multi-state cases are typically cases where a similar factual infringement 
scenario unfolds in a large number of countries, while ubiquitous infringement cases 
are cases where the infringement happens in virtually every country. The latter cases 
involve almost necessarily ubiquitous media, such as the internet, and often deal with 
copyright and other unregistered rights as these exist more easily in virtually every 
country.135 For all these cases Article 8 Rome II Regulation provides for the 
distributive application of the law of the country for which protection is sought on a 
country-by-country basis, without any special treatment. The large number of laws 
that must be applied can give rise to practical problems, such as burden of proof and 
increased duration and costs.136 
 
18.90 A solution for the problems raised by multi-state and ubiquitous infringement 
cases almost necessarily involves the application of a single law to these cases and the 
obvious connecting factor is then the closest connection, leading to the application of 
the law of the State that has the closest connection with the infringement. This 
remains an approach de lege ferenda (i.e. for the law to come), but something can 
already be achieved de lege lata (i.e. with the law as it stands). 
 
18.91 A peculiar multi-state infringement scenario unfolds when the infringement is 
much larger in scope in one country and much smaller in another country. A typical 
example arose in the Sender Fellsberg case, which led to the European Court of 
-XVWLFH¶V GHFLVLRQ NQRZQ XQGHU WKH QDPH Lagardère.137 A German broadcasting 
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antenna just over the French border was used by a French radio station to broadcast to 
France. While not an infringement case, the effects in Germany are very limited 
(some people could receive the signal), when compared to those in France. The Court 
of Justice ruled that German law applies in Germany and French law applies in 
France. In an infringement scenario (assuming e.g. that the broadcast involves musical 
works without proper copyright clearance) this would correspond to the distributive 
application of the laws of the protecting countries as provided for in Article 8(1) 
Rome II Regulation. This may seem unduly complex when considering the extremely 
low impact in Germany and it is very hard to justify the very heavy burden which 
Article 8(1) imposes in such a case. One would like to avoid the application of several 
laws, especially if many of them apply to minimal acts of infringement that lead to 
very little in terms of damage. Trademark infringement cases through a website that is 
essentially directed to one State is a good example. The fact that one could access the 
site in 20 other countries where the mark had been registered, but where the website 
did extremely little or no business should arguably not lead to the distributive 
application of 20 laws of the countries for which protection is sought. The solution 
can be found in the introduction of de minimis rules. These could e.g. stipulate that in 
the Lagardère style case the infringement in Germany would be de minimis and not 
taken into consideration. In practice one defines the minimum threshold for there to 
be an infringement,138 as this was done in the WIPO Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and other Industrial Property 
Rights, on the Internet.139 When adopted at international level such de minimis rules 
mean that each law of the country for which protection is sought will be interpreted in 
the same way and that de facto infringement is ruled out in several countries. In 
practice this alleviates the effects of the distributive application of the laws of the 
protecting countries on a country-by-country basis. 
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18.92 Such a de minimis approach is compatible with Article 8(1) Rome II 
Regulation. The applicable law is still the law of the country for which protection is 
sought and the distributive application on a country-by-country basis is still in 
operation, but each law of the country for which protection is sought has at 
substantive law level the same de minimis rule.140 This harmonised interpretation of 
the leges loci protectionis alleviates in practice the distributive application. Such a de 
minimis rule can be part of substantive IP law, but it can also be introduced by means 
of a (substantive law) provision in a private international law instrument.141 This 
provides a limited solution for certain multi-state cases. 
 
<a>IV. CONCLUSION 
 
18.93 On the positive side, it has been shown that the EU rules on private 
international law can be applied to intellectual property and can form the starting 
point for an approach that effectively addresses the cross-border aspects of intellectual 
property rights. On the negative side, it has been shown that the current set of rules 
remains incomplete and inadequate on certain points and that more detailed rules are 
needed for the approach to become entirely satisfactory. A complete example of such 
a satisfactory and comprehensive approach can be found in the CLIP Principles.142 
Maybe the time has come for the European legislature to build upon this private 
initiative. 
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